University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Critical Reflections

Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections
2015

Mar 28th, 11:00 AM - 11:30 AM

Fifty Shades Of Kramer: An Analysis of Kramer’s Account of The
Nature of Sadomasochism and Torture
Udoka Okafor
McMaster University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Okafor, Udoka, "Fifty Shades Of Kramer: An Analysis of Kramer’s Account of The Nature of
Sadomasochism and Torture" (2015). Critical Reflections. 4.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance/2014/cr2014/4

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Critical Reflections by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Udoka Okafor

McMaster University,

1

Fifty Shades Of Kramer: An Analysis of Kramer’s Account of The Nature of
Sadomasochism and Torture
Introduction
In his book, Torture and Moral Integrity, Kramer gives an account of
sadomasochism, and an analysis of instances of sadomasochism that counts as either
simulations of torture or torture itself. He also expounds an argument for why he thinks
that acts of sadomasochism are always and everywhere morally wrong. This paper is
going to examine the arguments put forth by Kramer with respect to the relationship
between sadomasochism and torture. Ultimately, this paper will argue that Kramer has a
very simplistic understanding of the nature of sadomasochistic relationships, and the
psychopathy of sexual sadists, which is what leads him to his crude conclusions. This
paper explores a very important subject, because the sadomasochistic community is a
sexually marginalized and a misunderstood community, and so if someone is going to
proceed to label some actions of the community as torture and all ordeals that take place
within the community as morally wrong, then that person must have a deep
understanding of the complexities of the community, which Kramer does not have. Thus,
this paper will explore and analyze the complex nature of sadomasochism, and
subsequently reject a majority of the claims that Kramer makes about the community.
Kramer’s Account Of The Nature of Sadomasochism and Torture
Sadomasochism is a subset or a subculture of the Bondage and Discipline,
Dominance and Submission, and Sadism and Masochism (BDSM) community.
According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, sadism is defined as the disposition
to receive pleasure, especially sexual gratification from inflicting pain, suffering, and
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humiliation on other people. Masochism, on the other hand, is defined as the disposition
to derive pleasure and sexual gratification from one’s own pain, suffering, and
humiliation. Thus, persons in a consensual sadomasochist relationship are involved in the
mutual infliction and reception of pain, suffering, and humiliation in a symbiotically
dialectical way. Sadomasochism is “the eroticization of dominance and submission. It is
about the ritualization of dominance and submission” (Weinberg, 404). An example of an
act that can take place within a sadomasochistic relationship is the flogging or whipping
of one party, usually the masochist, by another party, usually the sadist. In this case, the
sadist derives pleasure from flogging the masochist, while the masochist derives pleasure
from being flogged by the sadist.
Kramer expounds and furthers David Sussman’s account on the relationship
between sadomasochism and torture. Kramer, like Sussman, argues that acts of
sadomasochism fall into two categories, either they are a simulation of torture or they are
acts of torture. In order to understand these categories, Kramer makes three further
distinctions between acts of sadomasochism. In the first instance of an act of
sadomasochism that Kramer expounds, both parties have an agreed upon safe word
(Kramer, 44). Generally speaking, when a sadomasochistic couple, within the context of
a BDSM relationship engage in sexual acts, they usually agree on a safe word that the
masochist can say when they are uncomfortable with the sadist’s actions and wants them
to stop. Sussman argues, “the infliction of severe pain by a sadomasochist upon a willing
victim is not torture if they have agreed on a signal or some ‘stop words’ with which the
person who undergoes the painful treatment can bring it to a halt (Kramer, 44). Thus, in
this instance, the masochist holds absolute and effective power to withdraw consent from
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the act, and so this first case is an instance of a simulation of torture, but not the act of
torture (Kramer, 44). The second distinction that Kramer explicates, with respect to
Sussman’s view, is an instance of sadomasochism wherein “the tormentor makes it clear
that he does not recognize the victim’s right to opt out, taking himself to be as
unconstrained morally as he is physically” (Kramer, 44). In this instance, the sadist and
the masochist have agreed upon a safe word, but when the masochist utilizes that safe
word, the sadist completely ignores it. In this instance of sadomasochism, the act ceases
to be consensual and it is no longer a simulation of torture, but it is an act of torture.
Kramer describes a third instance of sadomasochism that Sussman does not
address, and this “is a situation in which no such signal has ever been arranged” (Kramer,
44). In this third instance, no safe word is agreed upon by both parties so as to maximize
the sexual gratification that both parties receive from the act (Kramer, 44). According to
Kramer, in the context “of sadomasochistic abuse where no opt-out arrangement is in
place, such abuse without such an arrangement is torture regardless of how
enthusiastically the victim has given his consent” (Kramer, 45). So, what distinguishes
the first instance of sadomasochistic acts from the second and the third instance is the
element of genuine or relevant control (Kramer, 112). Kramer argues, “the presence of
consent does not entail the presence of control, [as] there can occur instances of veritable
torture that are consensual” (Kramer, 112). In the first instance where a safe word has
been agreed upon, the act is consensual and since the masochist can halt it at any time,
there is also the presence of relevant control on the part of the masochist. In the third
instance of the sadomasochistic act, the act is consensual, but according to Kramer, the
masochist has no relevant control since they cannot end the act at any time, and as such
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the act amounts to torture. In the second instance of sadomasochism, the act is both nonconsensual and the masochist has no control since the sadist has completely disregarded
the agreed upon safe word, and thus the act amounts to torture. This element of control is
so important to Kramer’s conception of torture that he inserts it in the last line of his
definition, which states, “whenever the deliberate or extravagantly reckless infliction of
severe pain amounts to torture, the victim lacks any genuine control over the duration of
the infliction” (Kramer, 114).
Kramer has distinguished between simulations of torture and acts of torture itself
with respect to sadomasochism, and according to Kramer, even though not all acts of
sadomasochism are instances of torture, “sadomasochistic ordeals…are morally wrong in
all circumstances” (Kramer, 211). In order to derive the moral wrongness of acts of
sadomasochism, Kramer distinguishes between the victim focused and the perpetrator
focused perspective, when discussing sadomasochism. It should be noted, however, that
in the second instance of sadomasochism differentiated above, the victim-focused
perspective is enough to discredit this act of torture as morally wrong on Kramer’s
account. This is so because the sadist in this situation has completely disregarded the
explicit wishes of the masochist, and they are inflicting pain on the masochist in a nonconsensual manner, where the masochist lacks any form of relevant control. Thus, we do
not need to shift to the perpetrator-focused perspective to understand why the second
instance of torture is always morally wrong. However, in order to understand why the
infliction of sadomasochistic acts of torture are wrong in all of their instantiations, as
rendered in the aforementioned first and third instance, one must shift to the perpetrator
focused perspective (Kramer, 211).
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Kramer argues that “[the] derivation of sadistic gratification from the knowledge
that [they are] causing someone else to suffer grievously is what renders [their] behavior
morally illegitimate” (Kramer, 211). For instance, if Gabriella and Dick Cheney are
involved in a sadomasochistic relationship, where Gabriella is the sadist and Dick is the
masochist, what makes Gabriella’s actions always and everywhere morally wrong is that
Gabriella derives pleasure from Dick’s pain and misery, in a way that is very morally
demeaning for Dick (Kramer, 212). The consent that Dick gives undermines any victimfocused perspective, but it does not undermine any perpetrator-focused perspective. The
only thing that can undermine the perpetrator-focused perspective, on Kramer’s account,
is if Gabriella is an unwilling participant, and is merely engaging in sadomasochistic acts
with Dick, solely and exclusively for his pleasure, and not her own (Kramer, 211).
A Criticism of Kramer’s Account of the Nature of Sadomasochism and Torture
In order to respond to Kramer, this paper will first highlight the difference
between negative pain and positive pain that was expounded by Staci Newmahr.
Newmahr argues that pain is normally understood as an inherently negative experience,
wherein anyone who experiences pain is experiencing something harmful, or in the case
of a masochist, is having something harmful being done to them (Newmahr, 389).
Newmahr argues that there is such a thing as positive pain wherein pain ought to be
reframed, not as something that seeks to harm, but as a tool that seeks to invoke pleasure
in people, and this is especially evident in the context of consensual sadomasochistic
relationships (Newmahr, 398). Kramer is not oblivious to this difference, and he notes
that the act of interrogational torture is considerably worse than the act of sadomasochism
because, while the former seeks to inflict severe pain on its victim, the latter seeks also to
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inflict severe pain on its victim, but for the sake of pleasure (Krmaer, 164). However, in
this situation, he wants to frame the pain as instrumentally good, and in this way his
distinction falls short of the distinction that Newmahr seeks to make. With respect to
positive pain, Newmahr does not simply want to label the pain as instrumentally good,
rather she wants to label positive pain as intrinsically good. In her article she asserts that
in the context of sadomasochistic acts, “pain is pleasure” (Newmahr, 407). Thus, based
on Newmahr’s distinction, and contrary to Kramer’s argument, the masochist is not being
inflicted with negative pain, which would constitute a morally abhorrent act, as in the
second instantiation of sadomasochism described above. Rather, the masochist is being
inflicted with positive pain, which is conceptually, and practically synonymous to- and
not simply instrumental to- pleasure. With respect to sadomasochistic actions, positive
pain or pleasure is not morally abhorrent, as it does not vary from the pleasure that nonsadomasochistic couples seek during their various sexual escapades.
Kramer argues that what makes sadomasochism, always and everywhere, morally
wrong is the fact that the sadist is deriving pleasure and gratification from causing
someone else severe pain and suffering. However, as has already been argued above, the
pain being inflicted on the masochist is positive pain, which Staci Newmahr has argued is
synonymous to pleasure. However, another point to note is that Kramer has a very
simplistic and two-dimensional understanding of sadomasochistic relationships. He
frames his argument as though the sadist’s gratification comes, solely and exclusively
from inflicting pain, albeit positive pain, on the masochist and that is simply not true. In
Forensic and Medico-legal Aspects of Sexual Crimes and Unusual Sexual Practices, Anil
Aggrawal distinguishes between four classes of sexual sadists, Class I, Class II, Class III,
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and Class IV (Aggrawal, 176). Class I sexual sadists are persons who have sadistic sexual
fantasies but do not act on them (Aggrawal, 176). Class II sexual sadists are persons who
have sadistic sexual fantasies but only acts on these fantasies with consenting sexual
masochists (Aggrawal, 176). Class III sexual sadists are persons who have sadistic sexual
fantasies and acts on them with non-consenting victims, but does not seek to harm them
in any serious way (Aggrawal, 176). Class IV sexual sadists are persons who have
sadistic sexual fantasies, they only act on these fantasies with non-consenting victims,
and they seek to cause very serious harm to their victims or to kill them after the act is
over (Aggrawal, 176). Class I is equivalent to a dormant sadists, and Class III and Class
IV is equivalent to sadistic torturers and rapists.
However, in the context of a sadomasochistic relationship between two
consenting adults, the sadist will fall into the Class II division. The Class II sexual sadists
in this situation do not simply get pleasure from inflicting pain on others, but presumably
persons within this category will not get any gratification if they inflict pain on nonconsenting victims. Thus, it is not simply that these sexual sadists get pleasure
exclusively from other people’s pain, but these Class II sadists only get this sexual
gratification when the masochist on the receiving end consented to and is mutually
benefitting from the sexual acts, and as such they only get sexual gratification when they
are inflicting positive pain on the masochist. Kramer argues that the sadist morally
demeans and debases the masochist, and this is what makes their actions morally wrong
(Kramer, 212). However, it is not clear that this is the case in the context of a
sadomasochistic relationship with two consenting adults where the sadist is a Class II
sexual sadist. The sadist does not morally debase the masochist because they recognize
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them as an end in themselves, they recognize their pleasure as an end that is worth
pursuing, and they do not get any sexual gratification from merely inflicting pain on the
masochist, when the masochist is not mutually benefiting from the sexual act. Therefore,
Kramer’s account of a sadomasochistic relationship is too simplistic to encompass the
psychopathy of sexual sadists as described by Aggrawal.
The final issue that this paper will explore is the issue of consent and control
within the context of a sadomasochistic relationship. There were three discerned
instantiations of sadomasochistic acts; in the first instance the masochist was described to
have consent and control, in the second instance the masochist had no consent or control,
and in the third instance the masochist consented to the act but did not have relevant
control over the sadist’s actions. This paper does not seek to contest Kramer’s analysis of
the first two instantiations of sadomasochistic acts, rather it seeks to contest his analysis
of the third instantiation of sadomasochism, which is very problematic and unable to
grapple with the realities of sadomasochism. The third instantiation of sadomasochism
that was described by Kramer is described as edgeplay within the BDSM community.
During edgeplay, the masochist and sadist can agree that the masochist may not
use a safe word for the duration of the sexual act, and this decision does take some
control away from the masochist. However, before two parties engage in edge play, the
sadist and the masochist discuss every single sexual act that is going to take place and the
masochist gets absolute control in deciding what the sadist can and cannot do. The sadist
will have to disclose all the risks, whether large or small, that is constituted in the
proposed act and the masochist will get to factor that into their decision-making. The
masochist also gets to decide the degree of the action that the sadist engages in, but also
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how long the act is to take place for. For instance, erotic asphyxiation- strangling the
masochist- is an act that will render the masochist unconscious during the activity and so
they will be unable to use a safe word for the duration of the activity. However, the
masochist will get to decide if they only want to be strangled for at most three minutes,
and the sadist cannot go over the three minutes mark or they would have acted without
the consent of the masochist.
If the sadist, in anyway, coerces or deceives the masochist or does not adhere to
the very strict and absolute terms set out by the masochist, then the sadist’s actions
becomes an example of the second instantiation of sadomasochistic acts described by
Kramer, and thus their action is not one that is authorized by the masochist, the edgeplay
community, the sadomasochistic community, and the BDSM community as a whole. So,
even in the case where the masochist decides not to use a safe word, they still have some
relevant control over the sadist’s actions and the sexual acts of the sadist are therefore
constricted by the masochist’s terms. However, this only applies in Kramer’s third
instantiation of sadomasochistic actions, where a Class II sadist is involved, who only
seeks to exert positive pain on their consenting masochistic partner. Consequently, the
masochist has partial, if not total control in the relevant sense, during the third instance of
sadomasochistic acts, and so even by Kramer’s own framework, when the complexities
and realities of the sadomasochistic community is taken into account, it cannot be
correctly categorized as an act of torture, rather it constitutes a simulation of torture, as in
the first instance of sadomasochistic acts described by Kramer.
This paper has examined Kramer’s account of the nature of sadomasochism and
torture, and has criticized the simplistic nature of the account that Kramer expounds. This
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paper delved into the complexities and the realities of the sadomasochistic community,
and has argued that once these factors are taken into account, we must repudiate
Kramer’s conception of the moral wrongness of sadomasochistic acts. As was stated at
the beginning of this paper, the sadomasochistic community is a highly misunderstood
community, and so one must fully account for their complexities if one seeks to have a
substantive discussion about the community. The sadomasochistic community, and the
BDSM community as a whole tend to be criminalized by society. However, Kramer
argued in his book that sadomasochistic acts must not be criminalized, as the consent
given by both parties undermines any legal sanctions that can be brought against the
parties. The liberation, both morally and legally of the sadomasochistic community is a
civil rights and a constitutional rights issue, that must be expounded on further, but I
suppose that that is an issue and thus, a paper for another time.
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